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Ownership and Effectiveness of 
China’s Aid Projects in Africa*
Chuanhong Zhang,1 Xiaoyun Li2 and Dawit Alemu3
Abstract The notion of ‘ownership’ has occupied a central place 
in measuring the effectiveness of North–South cooperation. How 
is it represented in South–South cooperation (SSC) and how does 
it affect the effectiveness of SSC? There is no clear answer in the 
existing literature. In this article, we describe the representation 
of ‘ownership’ in SSC and explain how it has affected the 
process and impact of SSC projects using case studies of 
three uniformly designed Chinese agricultural aid projects in 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. Based on long-term 
participatory observation and in-depth interviews, we find that 
‘ownership’ in SSC is represented differently from project design to 
implementation. Divergence and ambiguity exist among different 
stakeholders on the operation of ‘ownership’. ‘Co-ownership’ of 
two partners at the local level contributes to the effectiveness of 
SSC projects while ‘de-ownership’ and ‘forced ownership’ have a 
negative impact on the survival and sustainable development of 
SSC projects.
Keywords South–South cooperation, ownership, effectiveness, 
China–Africa agricultural cooperation.
1 Introduction
The notion of ‘ownership’ has occupied a central place in 
measuring the aid effectiveness of traditional donors. The 
consensus is that without recipient-country ownership, 
i.e. recipient countries (implicitly government) as the primary 
agents in choosing policies and designing programmes financed 
by foreign aid (Savedoff 2019), it is impossible to form effective 
partnerships between donor and recipient. Since the mid-1990s, 
North–South cooperation (NSC) has strongly advocated having 
recipients ‘in the driver’s seat’ (OECD-DAC 1996).
Many scholars question theoretically the concept of ownership 
in terms of its ambiguity. For example, Raffinot (2010) argues 
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that market forces, and international norms and rules leave very 
limited autonomous space in which governments may formulate 
policy, while donor-driven agendas might be more effective 
than national ones if donors are more poverty averse and would 
actually be able to impose poverty reduction on an unwilling 
government. Saliba-Couture (2011) also highlights the ambiguity 
of the term, noting how its meaning varies when juxtaposed 
with qualifiers; for instance, ‘government ownership’, ‘country 
ownership’, ‘national ownership’, ‘democratic ownership’, and 
‘local ownership’. He also emphasises the low levels of effective 
ownership potentially associated with recipient governments’ 
lack of administrative capacity, financial resources, expertise, and 
information. 
Willem Buiter (2007: 651) considers the term ‘country ownership’ 
as ‘at best unhelpful and at worst misleading and obfuscating’. 
Buiter advocates abandoning the concept of ownership 
altogether. Booth (2012) argues that, rather than explaining lack 
of ownership, ownership itself should be considered an objective, 
not a precondition for effective aid.
The global landscape of development cooperation has changed 
drastically in the last two decades as more and more Southern 
countries are engaging in aid programmes. By advocating 
the principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit, and 
non-interference of partner countries’ internal affairs, South–South 
cooperation (SSC) is considered as a new and alternative 
paradigm of international development cooperation through 
creating ‘horizontal partnerships’, challenging the ‘vertical 
relationship’ of NSC. The horizontal approach featuring a 
demand-driven focus and ownership of partner countries can 
avoid the inherent inequality between donor and recipient in NSC.
It can also effectively decrease Southern countries’ dependence 
on external assistance through promoting their self-reliance. 
As Sha Zukang (2010), Under-Secretary-General for Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations puts it, ‘SSC carries little 
macroeconomic or governance conditionalities, which enhances 
countries’ ownership’. However, questions such as ‘Who is 
supposed to “own”?’ and ‘What is to be owned?’ in SSC are still 
fundamentally ambiguous (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck 2017). 
Moreover, the relationship between ownership and effectiveness 
is becoming more obscure and the actors involved are becoming 
confused about whether it is a precondition or an indicator of 
effectiveness.
Being the leading SSC provider, as well as the second largest 
economy in the world, China’s insistence on conducting 
development cooperation in the framework of SSC has aroused 
worldwide interest and has also met both censure and praise 
(Buckley 2013; Gu and Kitano 2018). The changing economic status 
of China makes the study on China’s practice in international 
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development cooperation more interesting to international 
scholars and China’s domestic policymakers (Gu, Li and Zhang, 
this IDS Bulletin). How ownership, the key principle in relation to 
measuring the effectiveness of NSC, is represented in China’s SSC 
could be a good starting point to understand the challenges and 
struggles of China’s approach. Current discussions on the trends 
of the ‘Southernisation’ of NSC and the ‘Northernisation’ of SSC 
during and after the Covid-19 pandemic in different roundtables 
and fora has made the topic even more relevant.
Against this backdrop, this article analyses the representation 
of ownership (who is supposed to own and what is owned) at 
the project level in Chinese SSC to see how it is different from 
that described/practised by traditional donors, and how SSC 
ownership affects the processes and outcomes of China’s aid 
to Africa. It uses three case studies of Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) in three African countries with 
relatively similar political systems (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 
2014): Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.4 A qualitative/
process-traced approach to evaluating project-level 
effectiveness of SSC was utilised. By answering the above-
mentioned questions, the research explains the process through 
which SSC is shaped by traditional development knowledge, 
while simultaneously reshaping new international development 
knowledge. The results of this research could inform Chinese 
and African policymakers of potentially better approaches to 
collaboration to raise the effectiveness of SSC.
2 Theoretical framework and methodology
Since the 1950s, agricultural assistance has been a priority 
area for China–Africa strategic partnerships and cooperation. 
As the flagship Chinese aid project to Africa, ATDCs have 
aroused the interest of many scholars since their initiation. The 
existing research on ATDCs falls into two categories: (1) social 
anthropological research focusing on the process and intention 
of ATDCs, with the aim of revealing the central features of the 
projects from the Chinese perspective (Li, Tang and Lu 2017; 
Xu et al. 2016); and (2) more nuanced investigations of the 
interaction between Chinese stakeholders and local counterparts, 
revealing the multiple realities and relationships during the 
process of project implementation (Zhang et al. 2019; Gu et al. 
2016; Scoones, Cabral and Tugendhat 2013). However, there is 
minimal explanation about the variance of the performance of 
ATDCs in different African countries from both partner countries’ 
perspectives. Very few studies focus on the cross-country 
analysis of how host-country systems influence the performance 
and impact of ATDCs in different contexts. There is a dearth of 
empirical, comparative research on the analysis of these uniformly 
designed (and, therefore, theoretically comparable) projects.
Rather than focusing on the outcome or impact of the projects, 
the research follows the whole process of the projects to see how 
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‘ownership’ was perceived and implemented at the project level. 
To achieve this, a ‘structured focused case comparison’ (George 
2019) was applied to analyse the variety of different causal 
patterns and the conditions under which each distinctive type 
of causal pattern occurs. In addition to the case comparisons, 
process tracing is used to conduct within-case analysis (Bennett 
2010). The comparison is straightforward as all three ATDCs have 
the same objectives, are uniformly designed, and have received 
identical support from the Chinese government.
Each case encompasses configurations of similar variables that 
involve interactions at different stages of project implementation. 
In order to explore the process of interaction between different 
stakeholders at different stages of the project, we operationalised 
the concepts of ownership and effectiveness through 
disaggregating them (see Figure 1). The representations of 
ownership at national, partner (implementing units), and individual 
(Chinese experts and local staff) levels were described to answer 
the question ‘How does ownership work in practice?’, from which 
we could also trace the variation of ownership during the process 
of the project: design, implementation, and evaluation. Three 
indicators were used to measure the effectiveness of the project 
according to the prescribed tasks of the projects: technology 
transfer, sustainability, and benefit distribution.
As mentioned in Section 1, there is a lack of clarity in the literature 
on ‘ownership’ of aid projects which inevitably influences the 
discussion in this article. In many ways, ownership is a much-used 
concept in the practice of development, but it has not been 
rigorously conceptualised academically. In this article, we follow 
the logic of Chinese project designers and the principles of SSC 
and explore how this logic was accepted and responded to by 
the actors at the local level through describing the representation 
of project-level ownership in SSC. Here, the meaning of ownership 
goes beyond host government ownership in NSC; it involves more 
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the ownership of the physical property, and the responsibility and 
benefit generated from the physical property.
The data were collected mainly from primary sources. The 
processes of project implementation were traced through 
participatory observation and in-depth open-structured interviews 
with key informants at different levels of the interactions, to illustrate 
the representation of ownership. The first author visited and spent 
some time in the centres in Mozambique and Tanzania between 
2013 and 2021. The data on the Ethiopian case were collected by 
the local co-author (2014–20). Thirty-nine key informants including 
government officials (9), project directors (7), technical experts (10), 
evaluation experts (4), and local beneficiaries (9) engaged with 
project implementation were interviewed, either in person or online. 
The secondary data were collected from the centres or the official 
websites. All the evidence was triangulated to ensure accuracy.
3 Representations of ‘ownership’ in China–Africa development 
cooperation
3.1 ‘Uniformity’ at the national level
The launch of the ATDCs follows uniform processes featuring 
mutual ownership and the demand-driven request of African 
countries. China expressed its intention to support African 
agriculture through ATDCs at the Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) Beijing Summit in 2006. After this 
announcement, African countries interested in ATDCs lodged 
a request through the Chinese Embassy in their country. The 
agreements prescribed the responsibilities of the two parties: the 
African country would provide the land, necessary infrastructure, 
and security of the centre, while the Chinese government would 
provide RMB40m for its construction. After the centres were 
completed, the ownership of the property was transferred to 
the partner country, but the centres were co-managed and 
operated by Chinese experts and local partners for three years 
to provide technology transfer and capacity building for local 
partners with funding support from the Chinese government. 
All the money from China went to Chinese companies and no 
budget support went to the host government. This was to ensure 
the principles of mutual benefit and equality of SSC, with both 
partners contributing to the project, either in money or labour.
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia were all in the first batch 
of African countries requesting ATDCs. The request reflected the 
desire for ‘national ownership’ by the host countries. The three 
countries all prioritised agricultural development in their national 
plans during the period in which the project was initiated. 
Mozambique formulated the Strategic Plan for Agricultural 
Development (PEDSA,5 2010–19) and the National Investment Plan 
for the Agricultural Sector (PNISA,6 2013–17). The Agricultural Sector 
Development Programme (2006–14), Long-Term Perspective Plan 
(2011–25), and the First Five-Year Development Plan (2011–15) 
promulgated by the Tanzanian government all provided targets 
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to be achieved by the agricultural sector in its contribution to 
national development plans (Zhang, Benjamin and Wang 2021). 
Ethiopia also published a national five-year development plan 
(2010–15), the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which 
emphasised the importance of rapid agricultural transformation 
through both large-scale commercial farming and smallholder 
production capacity enhancement.
Interviews with national-level government officials in all three 
countries confirmed the alignment of the projects with their 
national development strategies. The African ‘agency’ in leading 
the process at the national level was identified by the scholars 
(for example, Alemu and Scoones 2013). From the Chinese side, 
the three centres were uniformly designed with the same amount 
of funding input from China, a similar project duration period, and 
similar procedures in choosing the implementing units.
Distinct from traditional donors, China does not set target 
countries for providing aid. Its provision of foreign aid is totally 
based on the demand-driven request of the African countries 
and with no political conditionalities attached, but mutual 
responsibility is a precondition to ensure equality and mutual 
benefit. The ATDCs were co-designed by each partner country in 
the arrangement based on these principles, which is understood 
and accepted by national-level stakeholders. For complete 
projects such as ATDCs, one thing is very clear: the hardware in 
the centres belongs to the host country and China will continue 
to fund the centre until it becomes self-sustaining.
3.2 ‘Divergence’ at partner level
Divergence occurred after the project entered the technical 
cooperation stage. China together with each partner country 
designated implementing units for project implementation. 
Three state-owned agricultural companies won the bids from 
the open tendering in China and became the implementers of 
the three centres. The three companies were responsible for 
the construction and technology transfer until the centres had 
become self-sustaining. The host governments also designated 
local agencies, usually the Ministry of Agriculture or one of its 
affiliated institutions, to operate the centres with Chinese experts.7
According to the agreements, the local partners need to dispatch 
management staff, liaison personnel, and security guards to 
work in the centres. A technical assistance group consisting of 
technicians, a translator, and an accountant was dispatched 
from China as the project commenced the technical cooperation 
stage. Implementers from China understood that it was the 
African partner’s responsibility to organise training activities 
for them. The Chinese experts were only required to prepare 
the curriculum and teach in class or demonstrate in the field. 
This is a fair arrangement following the principles of SSC, as one 
policymaker of China’s foreign aid reported:
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To ensure the independence of the local partner, we do not 
provide direct budget support to the local partners. If they 
become the employees of the project, it will be difficult to 
keep their independence. Also, the contribution of the host 
government is very important to ensure equal partnership 
between the two countries.8
Again, this approach distinguishes SSC from NSC with the 
objective of ensuring ‘equal and inclusive ownership’ and ‘mutual 
accountability’.
However, it is hard for this arrangement to function after 
implementation starts. As no salary is paid to the local staff, the 
local partner can only designate its staff to work part-time for 
the centre. As the location of centres is usually far from the host 
partner’s urban headquarters (HQ), the full-time involvement 
of local staff is almost impossible. However, the local partner in 
Mozambique did a better job as the centre is just 23km from the 
HQ office of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST). Local 
liaison staff visited the centre frequently and facilitated some 
training and demonstration work.
Without the guidance of the local management staff, the Chinese 
experts in the Tanzanian centre also managed to reach out to 
different places in Tanzania with the help of the Chinese Embassy. 
In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) did not manage to 
assign any experts/staff to the centre due to budget constraints 
and distance (the centre was more than 80km from the local 
partner’s HQ). The minimal involvement of the local partner in 
centre management made the transfer of ‘ownership’ to the local 
partner difficult.
Divergence also occurred where an ATDC had a different 
understanding of the concept of ‘ownership’. In the Ethiopian 
case, the Chinese experts were waiting for the host partner 
to mobilise the local people for training, but the local partner 
did not dispatch any Ethiopian staff to the centre. When the 
first group of Chinese evaluators visited the centre in 2013 (one 
year after the project had commenced the period of technical 
cooperation), very few training activities had been carried out 
despite the centre having comprehensive facilities (maize and 
vegetable cultivation, agricultural machine demonstration, 
livestock for cattle and chicken rearing, mushroom production, 
and biogas demonstration), and the strongest team (12 Chinese 
experts with either master’s or bachelor’s degrees and field 
experience) compared with the centres in Mozambique and 
Tanzania. As the director of the Ethiopia centre stated, ‘We are 
here to demonstrate the technology, not to go out to the field to 
teach farmers. It is not in the plan’.9 However, this burden-sharing 
arrangement could be an obstacle for the centre to function 
as the host partners do not have the capacity or budget to 
facilitate the operation.
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In the Mozambican case, both partners were flexible in mobilising 
extra resources to cover participants’ training costs such as 
transportation and subsidies for being off work. To accomplish 
the task of technology transfer in the centre and to save costs, 
the local partner also took the initiative to incorporate the 
training programmes sponsored by other donors into the centre’s 
activities. The Chinese implementing company also cooperated 
with other Chinese companies in training local farmers. The 
implementing company in Tanzania has also been working with 
Chinese companies and undertaking the technology-transfer 
programmes supported by the Chinese Embassy. Later, the 
Chinese experts at the Ethiopian ATDC also started to go to 
the fields to teach local farmers to fulfil the tasks laid out in the 
national-level agreement. Therefore, the proper function of the 
centres depends to a large extent on the ‘agency’ or flexibility of 
the Chinese implementing companies.
3.3 ‘Ambiguity’ at the individual level
The ambiguity of the concept of ownership can lead to tensions 
between the Chinese experts and local staff aggrieved at and 
confused by an unclear division of responsibility. During the 
process of the centre being transferred to the host government, 
the issues relating to who should take charge of it were disputed 
at the individual level. When the then Mozambican president 
Armando Gebuza visited the centre, he urged the Chinese 
experts to grow more local vegetables and use local varieties 
of maize. But a door that had been broken by the students of 
a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) training class still 
needed to be repaired by the Chinese. The Chinese experts also 
refused to provide electricity from their generator to the security 
guards when power went off in the centre. The resulting chain of 
events was that when some thieves broke in, the security guards 
did not detect them. The Chinese director was badly injured by 
the thieves in the ensuing conflict. Fortunately, he recovered, and 
no property was stolen. However, the ambiguity of ownership 
(the question of ‘Who is responsible for what?’) contributed to the 
partners on the ground feeling ill at ease with each other.
The issue concerning who could use the facilities in the centre 
and how also began to be disputed, particularly when the 
facilities are profitable. The chicken-rearing facilities at the ATDC 
in Tanzania were considered to be the most advanced in the 
country. The scale of chicken and egg production was large 
enough for the centre to make a decent profit which could keep 
the centre self-sustaining after aid from China was phased out. 
However, in the local partner’s eyes, as an aid project, the ATDC 
should not have been conducting any for-profit activities. As a 
result, the centre stopped its chicken-rearing project.
Later, the local partner, the Chollima Research Institute, agreed 
to cooperate with the Chinese experts to relaunch the business 
by providing a new legal status to the centre on the condition 
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that it bought chicks from the Institute. However, the price of one 
chick offered by the Institute was about Tsh 7,000 (about US$3) 
whereas an adult chicken could be sold at Tsh 15,000–20,000 
(about US$6.5–8.5). The price of the chicks was too inflated to be 
accepted by the centre as it was deemed to be losing business. 
The Chinese experts were also unsure as to whether it was in 
fact the head of the Institute rather than the Institute itself that 
wanted to sell the chicks to them. After this event, the centre 
offered the Institute the opportunity to use the chicken-rearing 
facilities itself but by the end of 2019, the Institute had not taken 
any action.10 In the Ethiopian case, the ATDC was also subject to 
rigid regulations from the host government, and was not allowed 
to participate in commercial activities.
These ‘ownership’ issues deeply affected the Chinese experts’ 
identity in the host countries. Should they be treated as aid 
agency employees with free diplomatic visas, or should they 
have to apply for business visas? The Chinese experts in 
Mozambique had diplomatic visas but the process to apply for 
or update visas took a long time. All of the centres relied on the 
host-country liaison person to facilitate the visa process for them. 
The Chinese experts in Tanzania had to apply for business visas 
and pay US$250 every three months after the memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) for diplomatic visas expired. The Chinese 
experts had argued with the local partner to extend their 
diplomatic visas but the local response was: ‘Since you are 
coming to aid us, you need to pay us more rather than get a 
free service’. Moreover, every time the head of the local partner 
organisation helped them to obtain a visa, they needed to pay 
him a transportation fee (Tsh 100,000, approximately US$50), 
a labour fee (Tsh 300,000, approximately US$150), and provide 
a ‘gift’ (such as 10kg rice per visa). As one expert said, ‘We are 
working very hard to help them, but it seems that they are not 
grateful to us. We don’t feel we are welcomed by them’.
4 ‘Ownership’ and ‘effectiveness’ of SSC
In recent years, efforts have been made to measure and evaluate 
the impact of SSC. Inquiries have frequently assumed that SSC is 
unique, requiring a totally different set of principles and indicators 
to be measured. In the previous sections, we described how 
ownership was represented and understood by the two partner 
countries in SSC and how it affected the process of project 
implementation. This section explores how ownership affects the 
effectiveness of SSC based on evidence from the three centres.
To explore the relationship between ‘ownership’ and 
‘effectiveness’, we distinguish between three main forms of 
ownership which have evolved from our case studies: 
1 Mutual ownership – this is relatively close to the ideal type 
of host–donor relationship that SSC aspires to develop. It 
involves the co-contribution of physical property development 
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and maintenance, and the introduction of human resources 
to maintain the project. It requires the mutual respect and 
responsibility of both partner countries. 
2 De-ownership – this occurs when the understanding of 
‘ownership’ of the two partner countries or stakeholders 
from different levels diverge. One party wants to weaken/
expropriate the other party’s ownership for its own benefit or to 
follow its own principles. 
3 Forced ownership – this shares some similarities with 
de-ownership, but it also involves the abandonment of 
responsibility by one or both parties to force ownership on the 
one that is not ready to shoulder the whole responsibility.
The impact of these three types of ownership on project 
effectiveness (technology transfer, sustainability, and 
profit distribution) will now be explained through the case 
studies. Technology transfer was a stipulated task by the Chinese 
government. With funding of RMB15m (approximately US$2.2m), 
each ATDC needs to train 500 people/times per year and 
demonstrate advanced Chinese agricultural technology at the 
centre during the three-year technical cooperation stage. After 
that, the centre enters the sustainable development stage, which 
means no further support from the Chinese government and 
the centres would need to be self-sustaining, either run by the 
Chinese implementing units or the host partners, or both.
4.1 ‘Co-ownership’ and effectiveness of SSC – the Mozambican 
case
The Mozambican ATDC is considered the most successful project 
in terms of effectiveness among the three. The co-ownership of 
the centre by both partner countries contributes to its success. 
A consensus has been built that the Chinese experts will stay 
as long as the centre needs them, and the ultimate goal is to 
make the centre self-sustaining before it is completely taken 
over by the host partner. According to one local government 
official, ‘the centre will always be “China–Mozambique” ’.11 Chinese 
policymakers also think that the centre is an important platform 
for China–Mozambique cooperation and exchange. This is in 
large part due to the flexibility and compromise made by both 
parties at the local level (Zhang et al. 2019).
The centre’s performance in terms of technology transfer was 
more than satisfactory. Since 2011, it has selected more than 
ten rice varieties, six maize varieties, more than 20 vegetable 
varieties, and two cotton varieties, and transferred more 
than 20 technologies to local farmers. The Chinese experts 
have trained over 3,000 local people/times as well as 
800 demonstration households. The yield of one of the rice 
varieties reached 9 tonnes/ha, three times the local yield in 
2011. Two rice varieties, one cowpea variety, and one cucumber 
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variety trialled in the centre have been grown nationwide in 
Mozambique. The yield of a local maize variety grown by Chinese 
experts has increased to four times (6,750kg/ha) the local yield. 
The local director of the centre, Otilia Tamele reported that 
‘Chinese technical experts have made a great contribution to 
our country’ (Fang 2019). The centre also selected 15 promising 
Mozambican youngsters for short-term training and degree-level 
education in China.
In terms of sustainability, the centre has explored a survival 
approach after funding from the Chinese government stopped. 
Distinct from the Tanzanian and Ethiopian cases, the Mozambican 
partner has encouraged the centre to conduct business 
activities, such as selling the vegetables and rice that it produces. 
The profits were used to maintain the centre facilities. Also, as 
an important platform for Chinese–Mozambican agricultural 
cooperation, the centre introduced and cooperated with other 
Chinese companies investing in Mozambican agriculture. Two 
more Chinese agricultural parks in Gaza and Sofala provinces 
were constructed with the involvement of the implementing 
company of the centre.
Since August 2016, the local partner has been transferred to the 
Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture and the Institute of Agricultural 
Research Mozambique (IIAM), which started to get heavily involved 
in the daily management of the centre. The division of labour 
between the two parties was clearly stated, based on the principle 
of wide-ranging consultation, joint contribution, and mutual 
benefit. The China side is responsible for daily operations, while 
the local partner has responsibility for mobilising and coordinating 
local resources. The Chinese experts were still paid by the Chinese 
implementing companies while the seven local staff working in the 
centre were paid from the revenue it generated. Since 2017, the 
centre has been working with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
the World Bank, and other international partners on training 
programmes in Mozambique.
The centre is still on the way to exploring how to thrive. So far, a 
large part of the operating costs is still burdened by the Chinese 
implementing company, which means that the centre cannot 
be fully turned over to the host partner. With the long-term 
involvement of China, the vision of the ATDC is to help strengthen 
the agricultural value chain through attracting more international 
investment and support to Mozambique. As the business 
aspect of the centre is thriving, the sense of ownership from the 
Mozambican side is getting stronger, which might discourage the 
Chinese party’s continuous investment in the centre. One Chinese 
manager, Mr Y., shared the following story in an interview with the 
author Zhang Chuanhong:
In October 2018, Mr Y., the deputy CEO of the implementing 
company of China–Mozambican ATDC (Lianfeng company), 
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was sent to the police station just because he planned to take 
several sprayers out of the centre. The Mozambican police 
came and arrested him before he left the centre. The sprayers 
were transported to Mozambique with other goods in the same 
batch from the host company of Lianfeng in China. As the 
centre’s geographic location is convenient, some goods for the 
Friendship Farm (Saisai City, Gaza Province) were also stored 
in the centre. But when the Mozambican partners saw Chinese 
partners taking the materials from the centre, they reported 
this to the police. It was hard for the Chinese company to 
explain the complicated situation to the police. Mr Y. stayed in 
the police office for a few hours before the police officer was 
persuaded that he was not a thief. But the sprayers were kept 
in the centre.12
4.2 ‘De-ownership’ and effectiveness of SSC – the Tanzanian case
The ATDC in Tanzania has been maintained solely by continuous 
support from China. The centre has been performing well in 
terms of technology transfer. As mentioned above, more than 
3,000 farmers had been trained by the Chinese experts by the 
end of 2019. Since its implementation, the centre has worked very 
hard on self-financing through trying to create more operational 
income with the introduction of joint venture partners and 
business activities.
By setting up the commercial company in Tanzania and 
fully making use of the centre’s advantages in technical 
demonstration and extension, the centre will carry out 
various kinds of business in the field of crop farming, 
poultry-rearing, and food processing, in order to achieve profit 
to compensate the expenditure gap from public service in the 
centre. Meanwhile, the governments should give the centre 
corresponding policy support in the related aspects. 
(China-Tanzania ATDC 2013)
Since 2013, the Chinese implementing company has tried to 
extend its industrial chain by selling its fresh vegetables, quality 
rice, chickens, and eggs, and maize for feedstuff to the markets. 
However, the commercial activities run by the centre were 
questioned by the host partner, which thought that as an aid 
project it was not qualified for business activities and that if 
the centre wanted to do business, it should be registered as a 
business entity paying tax to the local government. But the fact 
that the ownership of the centre belongs to the Government of 
Tanzania, not the Chinese company, blurs the legal status of the 
centre. Under this scenario, the centre has had to shut off all its 
business activities. At present, the centre only functions as a pure 
aid platform undertaking different agricultural aid projects on 
training and technology transfer. The operation of the centre has 
been barely maintained by the Chinese implementing company. 
The local partner is not willing to run the centre itself as it lacks 
capacity to do so.
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The host partner’s expropriation of Chinese ‘ownership’ for using 
the facilities of the centre to do commercial activities without 
claiming ‘ownership’ and responsibility for itself makes it impossible 
for the centre to achieve the goal of sustainable development. 
To a large extent, the centre has lost its characteristics as 
an SSC project through the de-ownership of both partners. 
The focus on technology transfer may exert the long-term 
effect of ‘blood creation’13 for Tanzania. However, through the 
de-ownership process the host partner lost the opportunity to 
prosper with the centre. After the Chinese experts leave, the 
centre will be hard to sustain.
4.3 ‘Forced ownership’ and effectiveness of SSC – the Ethiopian 
case
The Ethiopian case failed due to its expectation of mutual 
contribution from the host government. After ownership of the 
centre’s hardware was transferred to the host government, the 
Chinese implementing company naively waited for the local 
partner to take the lead. This passive attitude resulted in the 
poorest performance of the centre across the three case studies. 
The major objective of the Chinese implementing unit was to 
accomplish the task assigned by the Chinese government 
through ensuring the smooth transfer of ownership to the host 
government. However, the limited involvement of the local partner 
and communities along with the context of socio-political unrest 
made the transfer an impossible mission. After Chinese experts 
were forced to leave due to political instability in 2018, the centre 
was looted. It was not until July 2019 that the ATDC was officially 
handed over to the Ambo Research Centre, which has converted 
it into one of its research sub-centres. Since, except for the 
buildings, much of the original technology demonstration fields 
have been considerably damaged.
From this case, it is clear that the consistent commitment of the 
Chinese partner is vital to keep the centre surviving and thriving. 
‘Forced ownership’ of a project by the host country or totally 
giving ‘ownership’ to the Chinese partner does not work under the 
principle of SSC and might be detrimental to the effectiveness 
of SSC.
5 Conclusions
Host-country ownership has been regarded as a central 
precondition for the aid effectiveness of NSC for a long time, but 
its ambiguity and paradoxicality have aroused controversy in 
both academic and policy circles. Very few studies have focused 
on the issue of ownership in SSC and its impact on programme 
effectiveness. In this research, we have revealed that project-
level ownership is far more complicated than the simple idea of 
national ownership advocated by traditional donors. Ownership 
under the SSC framework has also proved difficult and requires 
the consistent commitment and flexibility of the cooperating 
providers during implementation. Representation of ownership 
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varies among different levels of stakeholders as well as at 
different stages of project implementation. The approach to 
operating ownership by the implementing partners matters more 
than the uniformed concept of ownership reached at national 
level for the success of China’s SSC projects.
The results show that co-ownership may be the best approach 
for the effectiveness of SSC while de-ownership and forced 
ownership make sustainability and the survival of the SSC projects 
unlikely. These latter two approaches indicate that ownership 
in SSC is different from NSC as both partner countries need to 
contribute and shoulder responsibilities. The case studies also 
reveal that donorship in SSC is unfeasible as it is impossible 
for the SSC providers to control the whole process. This could 
be one advantage of SSC over NSC as it can overcome the 
inherent inequality between donors and recipients in NSC. From a 
long-term perspective, the whole ownership of the host country 
could be incubated. However, we concede that the research 
cannot cover the long-term impact of the project as it is only 
focused on the process of the project that is still going on. More 
research on the long-term impacts of a larger number of centres 
is needed to reveal the bigger picture in the future.
Space and time constraints mean that we are not able to present 
political economic analyses of the case studies to reveal the 
hidden causes that lead to the variations in performance of the 
ATDCs in the three countries. However, our preliminary findings 
reveal that the project-level stakeholders play a more important 
role for the effectiveness of SSC than was expected when the 
national-level design was undertaken. As with so many studies 
of aid programme implementation, ‘the devil is in the detail’. 
The implementation of SSC is not as easy as most policymakers 
might expect as host countries take time to accept this type of 
new cooperation modality. Patience is needed for SSC providers 
to ‘cultivate’ an equal partnership with the host partners. These 
results may help inform Chinese and African policymakers 
of potentially better approaches to effective development 
cooperation under the framework of SSC.
Notes
* This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
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